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This study examines the impact of investors’ buy and sell trades on Korean
stock market volatility across two crisis events, the Asian crisis of 1997 and the
2008 global financial crash. We investigate the trading behaviour of domestic
vs. foreign and institutional vs. individual investors. Our results suggest that
the buy and sell trades have an asymmetric effect on volatility that depends on
the type of investor trading and on the phase of the business cycle. Buy orders
appear to be more informative than sell orders since they mostly lower volatil-
ity in the pre-crisis periods, while sell and post-crisis buy trades affect volatility
positively regardless of who trades (institutional or individual investors) and
on what information (member, non-member). Most importantly, decomposing
total buy and sell trades into trader-type categories reveals that some institu-
tional investors are more informed traders that stabilize the market compared
to individuals that always increase volatility. Foreign investors reduce volatility
with their purchases and total trading activity in the whole Asian crisis sam-
ple, but only in the pre-crisis period before the recent global financial turmoil.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The relationship between trading volumes and volatility
has been analysed in numerous studies in the areas of
behavioural finance and financial econometrics; these
have shown that investors' trading activity affects stock
market volatility considerably, which has important
implications for financial regulators. The empirical evi-
dence on emerging markets has focused particularly on
foreign investors' behaviour. By contrast, following
Karanasos and Kartsaklas (2009), the present paper
investigates the volume—volatility link in the Korean
Stock Exchange for different investor categories (domes-
tic vs. foreign, institutional vs. individual investors) and
orders (buy vs. sell trades), during the 1997 Asian turmoil
and the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
to compare the two crises in terms of the volume—
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volatility link across different investor types. Our empiri-
cal analysis contributes to the behavioural finance litera-
ture and in particular the market microstructure research
about the impact of buy and sell trades on stock market
volatility during two of the main financial crises in the
last two decades. Karanasos and Kartsaklas (2009)
focused on the domestic vs. foreign investors' trading
activity around the Asian financial crisis. We extend their
work and examine the effect of domestic vs. foreign and
institutional vs. individual investors' buy, sell and total
trading decisions on range-based volatility measures. Spe-
cifically, our unique dataset makes it possible to investi-
gate the trading behaviour of seven different types of
domestic institutional investors, namely securities com-
panies, insurance companies, mutual funds, investment
banks, commercial banks, savings banks and other
companies.
The two main parameters driving the degree of persis-
tence in volatility and its uncertainty are estimated using
a bivariate GARCH model that is Fractionally Integrated
(FI) in both the autoregressive (AR) mean and variance
specifications. We refer to this model as the ARFI-FIG-
ARCH. It provides a general and flexible framework to
study persistent processes such as volume and volatility.
Overall, buy orders appear to be more informative
and value-driven, while sell orders are less informative
and possibly more market phase driven since they affect
stock market volatility positively. During both crises
domestic individual (as well as non-member institu-
tional) investors appear to have destabilized the market,
while the member institutional ones exhibit less of an
information advantage in the 2008 crisis compared to the
1997 Asian financial crisis (AFC).
In the two post-crisis periods trading activity destabi-
lizes the market. In the two pre-crisis periods, inside the
institutional non-members group, we find that active
investors lower volatility during the Asian financial tur-
moil, while in the case of the recent global crash the sta-
bilizers are the passive ones, confirming the hypothesis
that passive institutional traders use limit orders and
engage in contrarian trades. Interestingly, it seems that
active investors have engaged in herding and positive
feedback strategies during the GFC, when their total
trading has affected volatility positively. Finally, the
whole trading activity, as well as the foreign one, in the
two pre-crisis periods has stabilized the market, whereas
in the case of the GFC its impact on volatility has become
positive after the crisis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 reviews the existing empirical evidence on the
trading behaviour of institutional, individual and foreign
investors and allows us to develop our theoretical
hypotheses on the volume—volatility link. Section 3
describes the data, while Section 4 outlines the economet-
ric model and estimation procedure. Section 5 presents
the empirical results for different investor categories
around the AFC. In Section 6, we apply the dual long-
memory model of the volume—volatility link to the GFC
of 2008. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 | Hypotheses
In this Section we develop two hypotheses for the vol-
ume—volatility link. The first concerns the investment
style (Hypothesis 1, H1) and the second is based on the
investors' information advantage (Hypothesis 2, H2).
First, we look into the effect of active (insurance com-
panies, mutual funds, and investment banks) vs. passive
(commercial banks, savings banks and other companies)
institutional non-member investors based on a finer par-
tition of trading volume data into the six different non-
member categories. In line with the literature reviewed
below, we assume that traders who use market orders to
assure rapid execution (at the cost of large price impacts)
and engage in herding and positive feedback trades
(based on short-lived information) will exacerbate short-
run volatility (H1a). By contrast, traders who use limit
orders and pursue contrarian trades (based on long-term
information) will reduce short-run volatility (H1b).
Koutmos and Saidi (2001) investigate the positive feed-
back trading practice leading to excess emerging markets
volatility (H1a). Avramov et al. (2006) decompose sell
trades into contrarian and herding ones and they find
that herding trades increase volatility, while contrarian
trades have a stabilizing impact (H1b). Although for some
institutions the buy-sell decision has no association with
prior excess returns, for others there is a significant rela-
tion between trades and past excess returns. However,
the overall effect of these strategies may be offsetting,
because some traders engage in more contrarian strate-
gies, while others follow market trends. In general, we
would expect active traders to use market orders and
engage in herding and positive feedback trades, whereas
passive traders should use limit orders and pursue more
contrarian trades.
Secondly, we expect uninformed trading to exacerbate
stock market volatility (H2a), while informed trading will
be associated with less volatility in the Korean Stock
Exchange (H2b). For investors with no access to order
flow data (less informed) we expect a wider dispersion of
beliefs since they cannot differentiate short-term liquidity
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demand from changes in overall fundamental supply and
demand. As a result, less informed traders, here proxied
by individual and foreign investors, are expected to buy
and sell within a wider range of prices around the fair
value of the asset. On the other hand, if investors have an
information advantage due to access to market data, they
are likely to form homogeneous expectations about mar-
ket movements and the fundamental characteristics of an
asset. If this is the case informed traders, proxied by
member institutional investors in this study, are expected
to buy and sell within a small range of prices around the
fair value of the asset.
In this paper, we associate the trading of institutional
member and individual (and foreign) investors with those
of informed and uninformed traders, respectively. We do
so, not by means of serial correlation tests (Campbell
et al., 1993, Easley et al., 1997) or conditioning on past price
changes (Avramov et al., 2006), but by taking into account
the distinction made by the Korean Stock Exchange
between institutional (member and non-member) and indi-
vidual investors as in Daigler and Wiley (1999). Here, the
latter are treated as uninformed (or less informed), because
their orders are channelled through members' trading pits.
Moreover, individual investors are significantly affected by
psychological biases, which lead to increased levels of trad-
ing, systematic behaviour and high trading costs. Institu-
tional member investors are treated as informed because
members' direct access to the trading system provides them
with short-term information such as trading activity at spe-
cific prices, and price trends. They also have specific infor-
mation about their own customers' supply and demand in
the cash and futures markets.
Institutional or large block trades are more informative
than small trades and are more likely to cause permanent
price changes (Easley and O'Hara, 1987, Easley et al., 1997).
Daigler and Wiley (1999) find that the positive volume-vola-
tility relation is driven by the (uninformed) general public
(H2a), whereas the activity of informed traders such as
clearing members and floor traders is often inversely related
to volatility ( H2b). Kelley and Tetlock (2013) show that
overconfidence (not hedging) explains nearly all
uninformed trading. Abbes (2013) provides further evidence
of the destabilizing effect of trading volume on volatility,
which can be attributed to investors' overconfidence bias in
both developed and emerging stock markets. In the multi-
country context, several studies on the Asian stock markets
also find a positive relationship between aggregate trading
volume and volatility. For example, Pisedtasalasai and
Gunasekarage (2007) and Chuang et al. (2012) report a posi-
tive volume-volatility link for the Philippines, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Korea, China, Indonesia and Thailand. Finally,
Girard and Biswas (2007) find that volatility persistence
decreases when the trading volume is decomposed into its
expected and unexpected components in all markets under
investigation, including most Asian developed and emerg-
ing ones.
2.2 | Trading behaviour
2.2.1 | Sentiment
Increased volatility in financial markets could also reflect
sentiment-induced mispricing or time-varying risk (or risk
aversion that causes time variation in expected stock
returns). Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) argue that senti-
ment traders shift from safe to speculative securities when
sentiment increases, and from speculative to safe securities
when sentiment declines, and that these sentiment-induced
demand shocks drive mispricing in financial markets.
Moreover, market-wide sentiment should have a greater
effect on securities that are hard to arbitrage and difficult to
value. Consistently with this prediction, they find that when
sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high for
small, young, high volatility, profitable, non-dividend-pay-
ing, extreme growth and distressed stocks. When sentiment
is high, on the other hand, these categories of stocks have
relatively low subsequent returns.1
DeVault et al. (2019) find that commonly used measures
of investor sentiment capture the demand shocks of institu-
tional, rather than individual, investors. In other words, the
traders driving the sentiment-induced mispricing are institu-
tional, rather than individual, investors (on aggregate). In
particular, the level of institutional investors' speculative
stock holdings, relative to that of their holdings of safe
stocks, increases when sentiment is higher. More impor-
tantly, differences in investment styles (risk management
and reputation concerns, momentum and herding trading)
across types of institutional investors help explain institu-
tional sentiment trading. For example, institutions such as
banks, insurance companies and pension funds tend to
avoid holding and trading risky stocks, which implies that
they do not contribute much to aggregate institutional senti-
ment trading. By contrast, institutions such as mutual funds,
hedge funds and independent advisors are not only more
willing to hold such stocks but are also more sensitive to lag
performance, which suggests that risk management and rep-
utational concerns could influence their sentiment trading.
2.2.2 | Institutional investors
Much of the empirical research in finance views individ-
uals and institutions differently. In particular, while
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institutions are viewed as informed investors, individuals
are believed to be affected by psycho- logical biases and
often characterized as noise traders (Black, 1986). Institu-
tional investors consistently dedicate more resources to
acquiring and analysing information, while their trading
motives determine their investment styles (active or pas-
sive) and order placement strategies (market or limit
orders) when they buy or sell stocks in the securities mar-
kets. Actively managed funds buy and sell stocks on the
basis of valuation beliefs but, for some institutions, trades
are affected by pre-determined investment objectives
(index tracking, value, growth), liquidity needs and tax-
management purposes (Alexander et al., 2007). If active
institutional traders use market orders and engage in
herding and positive feedback trades, on the basis of
short-lived information, this is likely to increase short-
run volatility. De Long et al. (1990) argue that in the pres-
ence of positive feedback traders, rational speculation (or
trading by institutional investors) can be destabilizing
(H1a). On the other hand, passive institutional traders
who use limit orders and engage in more contrarian or
value-motivated trades are likely to reduce volatility in
the short run (H1b). Lakonishok et al. (1992) use data on
the holdings of tax-exempt (predominantly pension)
funds to evaluate the potential effect of their trading on
stock prices. Their evidence suggests that institutional
herding moves prices, but not necessarily in a
destabilizing way. For example, if all investors react to
the same fundamental information prices will adjust
faster to new fundamentals.
For the Chinese market, institutional trades are con-
sidered more informative and overall reduce market vola-
tility (Li and Wang, 2010). Cai et al. (2010), using a
unique dataset of the Chinese stock market, document
how a higher proportion of trades initiated by institu-
tional investors can be considered as informed (H2b)
compared to trades initiated by individuals (H2a). This
result is consistent with the argument that institutional
investors are better informed and therefore can earn big-
ger profits than individuals.2 By contrast, exploring the
incentives of institutional trading, Basak and Pav-
lova (2013) develop an asset-pricing model with institu-
tional investors' incentives to overperform their
benchmarks and find that their trading increases market
volatility.3
2.2.3 | Individual investors
Barber et al. (2009) show that the aggregate portfolio of
individuals performs poorly and almost all individual
trading losses can be traced to their aggressive orders.
Behavioural biases such as overconfidence can possibly
explain why retail investors trade so much and self-man-
age their portfolios (see Daniel et al., 1998; Odean, 1998;
Gervais and Odean, 2001; Kelley and Tetlock, 2013). Bar-
ber et al. (2009a) construct portfolios that mimic the pur-
chases and sales of each investor group in order to
analyse who gains and losses from trade. Individual
investors incur substantial losses, while institutional ones
(corporations, dealers, foreigners, and mutual funds) gain
from trade. Moreover, individual investors tend to hold
on to losing common stock positions and sell their win-
ners (the “disposition effect”), buy stocks that catch their
attention (or which they are familiar with), under-diver-
sify their stock portfolios and engage in naïve reinforce-
ment learning by repeating past behaviours that
coincided with pleasure, while avoiding past behaviours
that generated pain (Barber and Odean, 2008, 2011). As a
result, the buy and sell decisions of individual traders are
likely to exacerbate volatility, unless the liquidity pro-
vided by individual traders is matched by increased levels
of informed trading by institutional investors. Herding,
feedback and/or uninformed trading have the potential
to explain destabilizing stock prices or excess volatility
(H1a, H2a). However, they have also been used to
explain momentum and reversals in stock prices
depending on who trades and on what type of informa-
tion. Others also argue that individual traders overinvest
in stocks because they are familiar with them (or love
gambling), leading to under-diversification (Goetzmann
and Kumar, 2008) and average or even below-par returns
(Anderson, 2013). Barber et al. (2009b) provide evidence
that the trading of individuals is highly correlated and
persistent. This systematic trading of individual investors
is not primarily driven by passive reactions to institu-
tional herding, by systematic changes in risk aversion or
by taxes. Psychological biases contribute to the correlated
trading of individuals, which leads investors to systemati-
cally buy stocks with strong recent performance, to
refrain from selling stocks held at a loss, and to be net
buyers of stocks with unusually high trading volume.
Foucault et al. (2011) provide evidence based on French
data that individual investors as noise traders exacerbate
stock returns volatility, in line with (H2a). By contrast,
the study by Che (2018) concludes that individuals
reduce volatility in Norway, where they are shown to be
contrarian traders (H1b).
2.2.4 | Foreign investors
Brennan and Cao (1997) present a theoretical model and
empirical evidence that supports the view that foreign
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investors in the US have to pursue momentum strategies
and achieve inferior performance because they are less
informed than domestic investors (H1a, H2a).4 Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001) also find that foreign investors, and
often professionally managed funds or investment bank-
ing houses, pursue momentum strategies and achieve
superior performance. Chen et al. (2013) shed further
light on the positive relationship of foreign institutional
ownership on Chinese equities with stock return volatil-
ity. After removing momentum investing's contribution
to performance, they find that the momentum-adjusted
performance of foreigners is still highly significant (H2a).
Similarly, Che (2018) finds that foreign trading activity in
Norway increases volatility because foreign investors are
momentum traders while domestic institutions' trading is
mostly associated with lower volatility ( H2b).
Wang (2007) documents a strong contemporaneous
relationship between foreign equity trading and market
volatility in Indonesia and Thailand. Trading within for-
eign and local investor groups is often negatively related
to market volatility in Indonesia. This is consistent with
the view that within each group, investors are relatively
homogeneous in terms of capital endowments and infor-
mation. In particular, in Thailand foreign net purchases
are negatively associated with market volatility, therefore
they provided liquidity when local investors were under
stress to sell and helped to reduce volatility during the
Asian crisis by preventing the local markets from
dropping further than they actually did.
Turning next to studies on Korea, Choe et al. (1999)
find no evidence that trades by foreign investors had a
destabilizing effect on Korea's stock market over the
1996–1997 subsample. In particular, the market
adjusted quickly and efficiently to large sales by foreign
investors, and these sales were not followed by nega-
tive abnormal returns. Jeon and Moffett (2010) show
that foreign investors in Korea are involved in herding
and positive feedback strategies (H1a).5 Likewise, Bae
et al. (2011) provide evidence that foreign and domestic
institutional investors trade like momentum traders
(H1a, H2a) while individuals behave like contrarians
(H1b). Interestingly, Umutlu and Shackleton (2015)
point out that uninformed individuals' trading exerts a
positive influence on equities volatility (H2a), whereas
trading by informed domestic institutional investors
reduces volatility (H2b). They also find that foreign
trading mostly drives volatility higher (H2a).
According to a more recent study on investor senti-
ment in the Korean Stock Exchange by Yang
et al. (2017), foreign and domestic institutional inves-
tors are more informed (H2b) than individuals, who
are mostly affected by psychological biases and act as
noise traders (H2a). Table A3 in the Appendix summa-
rizes the main papers presented in this Section.
3 | DATA AND SUB-PERIODS
We first investigate the trader-type effect of buy and sell
trades on volatility for the KOSPI 200 index from 1995
until 2005. This period seems suitable to capture changes
in the trading activity across investors. As the market
expands and traders become aware of the market's poten-
tial, the impact of different investors' trading on volatility
becomes very important. In this study, the trading of
individual and foreign investors changed significantly in
the aftermath of the AFC. The dataset consists of daily
data on high, low, open and closing prices of the KOSPI
200 index of the Korean Stock Exchange from the third
of January 1995 to the 26th of October 2005 (2,850 obser-
vations). For the same period, daily buy and sell trades by
eight different types of domestic investors are also avail-
able. Specifically, the Korean Stock Exchange publishes
the daily buy and sell value (and volume) traded by eight
types of domestic investors. Domestic investors are also
split into institutionals and individuals, and institutionals
are further divided into members and non-members
based on their access to the trading system and its infor-
mation. Non-member institutional investors consist of
insurance companies, mutual funds, investment banks,
commercial banks, savings banks and other companies.
Finally, daily trading volume data are also available for
(non-member) foreign investors of the Korean Stock
Exchange. The first part of our empirical analysis focuses
on the decade around the AFC. In Section 6, we will use
data from the decade around the GFC, in order to investi-
gate the volume—volatility link during the most recent
financial turmoil and compare the two crises in terms of
the trader-type effects stabilizing or destabilizing the
stock market.
The case of Korea is particularly interesting since this
country considerably improved its economic performance
and attracted much greater capital inflows in the period
from 1996 to 2015. In particular, Korean GDP grew by
6.5% (on average per year) from 1996 to 2005 and by 3.5%
from 2006 to 2015, and net capital flows were positive
and averaged almost two billion dollars over the whole
period considered. The AFC in 1997 also brought changes
to the Korean financial system such as abolishing the for-
eign ownership ceiling in the stock market, allowing free
movement of investment profit, and providing transpar-
ent financial reports. Moreover, the Korean Derivatives
Market opened in 1996 by introducing the KOSPI200
Index Futures. Since then, it has developed into an
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international exchange following the establishment of
the KOSPI200 Options Market in 1997 and the Korea
Treasury Bond Futures and the US Dollar Derivatives
Market in 1999. As a result of the rapid growth of
options/futures trading in the KOSPI 200, the KRX Deriv-
atives Market overtook the main American, European
and other international exchanges to become a world
leader in terms of annual trading volume. Specifically,
the ratio of KOSPI200 futures cash trading value
increased from 0.3 in 1997 to 2.5 in 2015.6 These develop-
ments together with the two financial crises (the Asian
and global financial ones) the Korean Stock Exchange
went through raise interesting research questions about
their impact on investors' trading behaviour and stock
market volatility over the last 20 years.
The Korean stock market has attracted the interest of
various researchers (Choe et al., 1999, 2005, Jeon and
Moffett, 2010, Umutlu and Shackleton, 2015) due to the
unique dataset on the different trader types provided by
the Korean Stock Exchange. It is undoubtedly one of the
fastest growing stock markets (Bae et al., 2011) after it
experienced a radical liberal reform of its financial sys-
tem by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following
the AFC, which led to dramatic capital inflows from for-
eign institutional investors (Kim et al., 2005). However,
nowadays, South Korea still remains at the frontier
between emerging and developed markets. MSCI con-
siders the Korean market in the emerging Asia-Pacific
area7 while FTSE has classified Korea in the developed
markets since 20098, which suggests that it shares charac-
teristics of both market categories, developed (MSCI:
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan) and emerging (MSCI:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, etc.) Asian
markets. For example, according to the MSCI Accessibil-
ity Review, in terms of openness to foreign ownership,
South Korea's qualitative level of openness can be com-
pared to similar levels of emerging markets like China,
Malaysia and Philippines and the developed markets of
Hong Kong and Singapore. Ease of capital flows, market
infrastructure and regulation measures are also compara-
ble, exhibiting significant similarities among the Asian
stock exchanges. By contrast, institutional framework
standards in the emerging Asian markets remain behind
the developed economies. Korea faces issues concerning
its foreign exchange market liberalization, which repre-
sents an obstacle to its being classified as an MSCI devel-
oped market. Finally, Yang et al. (2017) focus on Korean
investor sentiment, considering the Korean Stock
Exchange as a representative emerging market character-
ized by significant information asymmetry with respect
to investor types, high market sentiment, prevalent inves-
tor psychology, unique investor participation rates and
the various trading purposes of market participants. In
conclusion, the KOSPI 200 index is widely regarded as a
leading emerging financial market index in East Asia,
which is worthy of closer investigation with important
implications for the whole region.
3.1 | Price volatility
Using data on the daily high, low, opening and closing
prices in the index we generate a daily measure of price
volatility. We can choose from among several alternative
measures, each of which uses different information from
the available daily price data. To avoid the microstructure
FIGURE 1 Garman-Klass
volatility (AFC period)
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biases introduced by high- frequency data, and on the
basis of the conclusion of Chen et al. (2006) that range-
based and high-frequency integrated volatility provide
essentially equivalent results, we employ the classic
range-based estimator of Garman and Klass (1980) to




u2− 2ln2−1ð Þc2, tℕ,
where u and c are the differences in the natural loga-
rithms of the high and low, and of the closing and open-
ing prices respectively. Figure 1 plots the Garman-Klass
(GK) volatility from 1995 to 2005.
Various measures of GK volatility have been
employed by, among others, Daigler and Wiley (1999),
Kawaller et al. (2001), Wang (2002), Chen and
Daigler (2008) and Chen et al. (2006). Chou (2005) pro-
poses a conditional autoregressive range (CARR) model
for the range, defined as the difference between the high
and low prices. In line with previous research, in what
follows we model GK volatility as an autoregressive pro-
cess taking into account the feedback from volume to vol-
atility, dual long-memory characteristics and GARCH
effects.
3.2 | Trading activity
We use the daily trading volume of foreign investors and
eight different domestic investors, that is individual
investors, securities companies, insurance companies,
mutual funds, investment banks, commercial banks, sav-
ings banks and other companies. Trading volume is also
aggregated into four categories based on investor type
(institutional, individual) and access to the trading sys-
tem (member, non-member). Specifically, the four aggre-
gate categories used here are member institutional
(securities companies), non-member institutional (insur-
ance companies, mutual funds, investment banks, com-
mercial banks, savings banks, other companies), non-
member individual and non-member foreign investors.
We analyse each volume series from its buy and sell side,
as well as its total ([buy+sell]/2). Further, we use the buy
and sell volume series for the turnover and include this
as a measure of buy and sell trades in our model. This is
computed as the ratio of the value of shares bought or
sold to the value of shares outstanding (see Campbell
et al., 1993; Bollerlsev & Jubinski, 1999). Because trading
volume is non-stationary several detrending procedures
for the volume data have been considered in the empiri-
cal finance literature (see Lobato and Velasco, 2000). We
form a trend-stationary (DTRt) time series of log-turnover
(TRt) by incorporating the procedure used by Campbell










This metric produces a time series that captures the
change in the long-run movement in trading volume (see
Brooks, 1998; Fung and Patterson, 1999). The moving
average procedure is deemed to provide a reasonable
compromise between computational ease and effective-
ness.9 Figure 2 plots the total turnover volume from Jan-
uary 1995 to October 2005.
FIGURE 2 Turnover
volume (AFC period)
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the
breakdown of the total buy and sell volume into four
trader categories. Average (daily) total trading volume
is 510 trillion Korean Won for the 3 years ending in
1997. There is a fourfold increase in the average trad-
ing volume from 1998 to 2000 and it reaches the stag-
gering amount of 3,607 trillion Won towards the end of
2003. This increase in trading volume across the years
is not shared evenly among the different types of
traders. Individual investors are the major players in
the Korean Stock Exchange. From 1995 to 2000 nearly
75% of all buy and sell trades involve individual inves-
tors, while from 2000 onwards this percentage falls to
near 50%. The presence of foreign investors in the cash
market increases significantly from 2001 to 2003, with
the buy side reaching 37.9% of the total buy volume
compared to an average of 7% from 1995 to 2000. The
sell trades also increased during the same period, but
not as much as the buy ones.
Member institutional investors' average percentage of
buy trades was only 5.1% for the 3 years ending in 1997
and, thereafter, decreased to 2.1% for the 2 years ending
in 2005. The sell side figures for the same investors are
not very different. Finally, non-member institutional
investors' trading was slightly above 10% until the end of
2003, reaching a maximum of 17.1% by the end of our
sample. Their sell trades are close to 15% of total sell vol-
ume across all the subperiods examined.
3.3 | Structural changes
We further examine whether the trader type buy and sell
effects on volatility are robust to the AFC, which hit the
major Asian economies at the end of 1997, and had reper-
cussions until the end of 1998. It also brought about
changes in the Korean Stock Exchange such as
abolishing the foreign ownership ceiling, allowing free
movement of the profit on investment and providing
transparent financial reports. These developments,
together with the introduction of index futures/options
trading during the same period, raise interesting research
questions about the impact of buy and sell trades on vola-
tility. Another reason for investigating the after-crisis
period is that foreign investors significantly increased
their participation in stock trading. We test for structural
breaks by employing the methodology of Bai and Per-
ron (1998, 2003a,b), who address the problem of testing
for multiple structural changes in a least-squares context
and under very general conditions.
Our results (not reported) indicate two breaks for vol-
atility. The first is detected in October 1997 and the sec-
ond in November 2000. Accordingly, we split the sample
into three sub-periods. The first is the pre-crisis period
and spans from January 3, 1995, to October 15, 1997
(Subsample A hereafter). The second is the post-crisis
period (including the in-crisis period and the economic
recovery of Korea) and spans from the October 16, 1997,
TABLE 1 Trading volume by
trader type (AFC period)
Panel A: Average buy volume as a percentage of total buy volume
Investor type (1) (2) (3) (4) Total
Period
1995–97 5.1% 12.1% 76.9% 5.9% 510
1998–00 3.1% 13.2% 75.5% 8.2% 2,157
2001–03 2.3% 10% 49.8% 37.9% 3,607
2004–05 2.1% 17.1% 58.1% 22.7% 2,520
Panel B: Average sell volume as a percentage of total sell volume
Investor type (1) (2) (3) (4) Total
Period
1995–97 6.1% 17.6% 70.9% 5.4% 510
1998–00 3.5% 14.2% 75.4% 6.9% 2,157
2001–03 3.4% 14.1% 70.1% 12.4% 3,607
2004–05 2.2% 16.3% 59.4% 22.1% 2,520
Note: This table presents daily average buy and sell volume statistics for four trader categories:
Member Institutional (1), Non-member Institutional (2), Non-member Individual (3) and Non-
member Foreign (4). Panel A (B) shows the percentage breakdown of buy (sell) volume by category
and the total daily volume (in trillion Korean won). Percentages sum to 100 over each period.
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to the October 26, 2005 (Subsample B hereafter). The third
goes from November 7, 2000, to the October 26, 2005, and
is the post-crisis period (excluding the in-crisis sample)
characterized by a world recession, which starts with the
second break in volatility (Subsample B1 hereafter). The
results for subsample B1 are totally consistent with those
for Subsample B and are omitted for brevity's sake.
Subsample A can be characterized as the tranquil and
pre-(currency) crisis period. This was the time when Korea
was regarded as one of the miracle economies in East Asia,
and foreign investors were enthusiastic about investing in
the country. The first break in volatility is associated with
the AFC in 1997. While Korea's own currency crisis would
come later, in November of that year, the currency of Thai-
land, the Baht (and other currencies in Asia) was already
the target of speculative attacks in June. The Thai Baht col-
lapsed at the beginning of July, marking the beginning of
what we now call the AFC. The Thai crisis sent repercus-
sions throughout the region. Subsample B is the post-crisis
period including the in-crisis period and the economic
recovery. On November 18, 1997, the Bank of Korea gave
up defending the Korean Won. On November 21, the
Korean government asked the IMF for a bail-out. The Asian
crisis effects lasted until the end of 1998 and, thereafter, the
Asian markets and the economies began to recover despite
the significant uncertainty related to emerging markets in
Russia, South America and Asia in October 1998. In 1999–
2000 the Korean economy achieved an early and strong
recovery from the severe recession. After 2000 the Korean
economy faced many economic and political challenges
compounded by a global economic slowdown with hesitant
recovery and domestic and global uncertainty ahead (Crotty
and Lee, 2006). The internationalization of capital markets
was reflected not only in the addition of foreign securities
to otherwise domestic portfolios, but also in active trading
in foreign markets (Dvořák, 2001). In the case of Korea, the
share of foreign trading activity in total stock market vol-
ume and the foreign stock ownership increased significantly
in the post-2000 period.
4 | ESTIMATION PROCEDURES
4.1 | Estimation methodology
Tsay and Chung (2000) have shown that regressions involv-
ing FI regressors can lead to spurious results. Moreover, in
the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity Vilasuso
(2001) suggests that causality tests can be carried out in the
context of an empirical specification that models both the
conditional means and conditional variances. Also, in many
empirical applications the sum of the estimated variance
parameters is often close to one, which implies integrated
GARCH (IGARCH) behaviour. For example, Chen and
Daigler (2008) emphasize that in most cases both variables
exhibit significant persistence in their conditional variances.
In particular, the sum of the variance parameters was at
least 0.95. Most importantly, Baillie et al. (1996), using
Monte Carlo simulations, show that data generated from a
process exhibiting FIGARCH effects may be easily mistaken
for IGARCH behaviour. Therefore, we focus our attention
on long memory and persistence in terms of the second
moments of volatility. Consequently, we utilize a univariate
ARFI-FIGARCH model to test for the causal effect of vol-
ume on volatility. Next we discuss the dual long-memory
model for volatility.
4.2 | Dual long memory
Let us first define the two variables. In the expression below
the equation represents the GK volatility (V Lt), where turn-
over volume (TVt) is added as a regressor. The ARFI(1, dm)
model for the conditional mean of volatility is given by
1−Lð Þdmϕ Lð Þ VLt−φsLsTVt−μð Þ= εt, ð1Þ
where L is the lag operator, ϕ Lð Þ=1−Ppi=1ϕiLi is the
AR polynomial, and 0≤ dm≤ 1. The φs coefficient cap-
tures the effect from volume on volatility. We assume εt
is conditionally normal with mean 0 and variance ht.
Further, the FIGARCH(1, dv, 1) process for the condi-
tional variance of volatility is defined by
1−βLð Þht =ω+ 1−βLð Þ− 1−cLð Þ 1−Lð Þdv
h i
ε2t , ð2Þ
where ω  (0, ∞) and 0 ≤ dv ≤ 1. Note that the FIG-
ARCH model is not covariance stationary. Whether it is
strictly stationary or not is still an open question at pre-
sent (see Conrad and Haag, 2006). In the FIGARCH
model, conditions on the parameters have to be imposed
to ensure the non-negativity of the conditional variances
(see Conrad and Haag, 2006 and Conrad, 2010). When
dv = 0 the model reduces to the GARCH(1, 1) model:
1−βLð Þht =ω+ αLε2t , where α = c− β.
5 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 | Model characteristics
Within the framework of the ARFI-FIGARCH model, we
analyse the dynamic adjustments of both the conditional
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mean and variance of volatility for all three AFC subsam-
ple periods and the entire sample, as well as the implica-
tions of these dynamics for the direction of causality from
volume to volatility. The estimates of the various
formulations were obtained by quasi-maximum likeli-
hood estimation as implemented by James David-
son (2017) in time-series modelling. To check for the
robustness of our estimates we used a range of starting
TABLE 2 Mean equations: Fractional parameters dm (AFC period)























































Panel B: Member/Non-Member—Domestic/Foreign Investors






































Notes: The table reports the fractional parameter estimates of the long memory in the mean equations. dm is defined in Equation (1). The
estimates are reported only for the case when total volume is added as a regressor. Estimates with buy/sell volume as regressors are very sim-
ilar to total volume. The estimates for subsample B1 are not reported for space reasons. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. The num-
bers in parentheses are standard errors.
TABLE 3 Variance equations: Fractional parameters dv (AFC period)












































Panel B: Member/Non-Member—Domestic/Foreign Investors



























Notes: The table reports the fractional parameter estimates of the long memory in the variance equations. dv is defined in Equation (2). The
estimates are reported only for the case when total volume is added as a regressor. Estimates with buy/sell volume as regressors are very sim-
ilar to total volume. The estimates of the subsample B1 are not reported for space reasons. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. The
numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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values and hence ensured that the estimation procedure
converged to a global maximum.
The best-fitting specification (see Equation (1)) is cho-
sen according to the minimum value of the information
criteria. For the conditional mean of volatility (V Lt), we
choose an ARFI(3, dm) process for the pre-crisis period
and an ARFI(1, dm) for the other two subsamples and the
entire period. That is, ϕ(L) = 1 − ϕ3L3 and ϕ(L) = 1
− ϕ1L, respectively. We also calculate Ljung–Box Q statis-
tics at 12 lags for the levels and squares of the standard-
ized residuals for the estimated dual long-memory
models. The test results show that the time-series models
for the conditional mean and the conditional variance
adequately capture the distribution of the disturbances.
Autoregressive coefficients and test statistics are not
reported for space considerations.
Moreover, we employ the diagnostic tests proposed by
Engle and Ng (1993), which focus on the asymmetry of
the conditional variance to news. According to the joint
test of the size and sign bias, for the entire sample period,
the sign and the negative size bias test statistics (not
reported) for asymmetries in the conditional variance of
volatility are significant. For the pre-crisis period
(subsample A) there is no indication of asymmetry in the
conditional variance. By contrast, for the post-crisis
period (Subsample B) the results from the diagnostic tests
point to the presence of a leverage effect in the condi-
tional variance10 .
Finally, the application of a bivariate extension of the
dual long-memory model does not have an impact on the
empirical findings produced by the univariate one.
5.2 | Fractional mean parameters
Estimates of the fractional mean parameters are shown
in Table 2. In all cases, the estimated value of dm is
robust to the measures of volume used11 . In other
words, all ARFI models for the subsamples generated
very similar estimates of dm. For example, in the total
sample, the 12 long-memory mean parameters are
between 0.40 and 0.44 . For the post-crisis period (Sub-
sample B) the estimated values of dm (0.38–0.42) are
similar to the total sample's estimates but higher than
the corresponding values for the pre-crisis period (sub-
sample A): 0.23–0.27. Overall, we find that the
TABLE 4 Mean equations—Cross effects of Institutional Non-members (AFC period)
Panel A: Active Institutional Non-member Domestic Investors
Insurance companies Mutual funds Investment banks





















































































Panel B: Passive Institutional Non-member Domestic Investors
Commercial banks Savings banks Other companies


























































































Note: The table reports parameter estimates of the cross effects φsin the mean equations (as defined in (1)). The estimates of subsample B1
are not reported for space reasons. ***, **, *, and ∘ denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 levels, respectively. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. The numbers in brackets are the lag order s of the regressor.
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apparent long-memory in volatility is quite robust to
mean shifts.
5.3 | FIGARCH specifications
Table 3 presents the estimates of the fractional parameter
of the FIGARCH model. The parameter dv governs the
long-run dynamics of the conditional heteroskedasticity
of volatility and is robust to the measures of volume used.
In other words, all FIGARCH models for the various sub-
samples generated very similar fractional variance
parameters. In the post-crisis period, these (0.55–0.59) are
higher than the corresponding parameters for the total
sample (0.40–0.43); in the case of commercial banks'
turnover the estimate of dv for the total sample (0.49) is
also higher than the corresponding one (0.46) lower for
Subsample B. In the pre-crisis period the estimates of dv
are close to and not significantly different from zero. In
other words, the conditional variances are characterized
by GARCH behaviour. Overall, when we allow for struc-
tural breaks the order of integration of the variance series
decreases considerably, and in the pre-crisis period the
long memory in variance disappears. Finally, the esti-
mated values of the GARCH coefficients in the condi-
tional variance are robust to the different volumes added
as regressors (see the Appendix, Tables A1, A2). Note that
in all cases the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
non-negativity of the conditional variances are satisfied
(see Conrad Haag, 2006).
5.4 | Trade links with volatility
To sum up, we employ the univariate ARFI-FIGARCH
model with lagged values of volume included in the
mean equation of volatility to test for causality. The
estimated coefficients φs, defined in Equation (1),
which capture the possible feedback between the two
variables, are reported in Tables 4 and 5. We also tested
the contemporaneous effect of volume on volatility
adding the volume series in the volatility Equation (1)
with lag order s = 0. The estimated value of φ0 (not
reported) was always positive and significant, which
indicates a positive contemporaneous effect of volume
on volatility. Regarding the lags used to find the causal
effect, we tested for the significance of up to the twenti-
eth lag. The first two lags show an immediate causal
effect of volume on volatility, lag order five indicates a
one-week effect and so on. The twentieth lag points to
a one-month in advance effect of the trading turnover
volume on the market's volatility, which we interpret
TABLE 5 Mean equations—Cross effects (AFC period)
Panel A: Institutional and individual domestic investors
Institutional members Institutional non-members Individual






















































































Panel B: Total, domestic and foreign investors
Total Domestic Foreign




















































































Note: See notes in Table 4.
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as a weaker relationship between the two variables (i.
e., other companies' total volume in Subsample B and
securities companies-members' purchases in Subsam-
ple B). In most cases, we used up to eight lags to detect
the causal effect. Likelihood ratio tests and information
criteria have been used to choose the specification for
the feedback from volume to volatility.
5.4.1 | Institutional investors (non-
members)
Panels A and B of Table 4 give the results of the vol-
ume—volatility link for six different institutional domes-
tic investor groups that are regarded as non-members of
the market.
For the three active investors' (insurance compa-
nies, mutual funds, and investment banks) trades in
the period after the AFC, we observe that buy and sell
trades are associated with more volatility, possibly
pointing towards momentum and positive feedback
trading activities (thus, supporting H1a). However,
their trades have an asymmetric feedback effect on vol-
atility up to the AFC break, with buy orders having a
stabilizing effect and sell orders a destabilizing one.
Active investors are oriented towards trading and
investing in stock markets and are more likely to spend
extra resources to acquire and analyse important com-
pany fundamental and market-wide information
(despite not holding a seat on the stock exchange). It
seems that the buy decisions of this group of investors
are more informative in terms of value, resulting in less
price volatility for subsample A (in line with H2b). The
evidence for the whole sample suggests that, for the
three active investors, the causal negative effect from
total volume to volatility reflects the causal relation
between buy trades and volatility in the pre-crisis
period.
TABLE 6 The volume—Volatility
link (AFC period)
Panel A: Active Institutional Non-member Domestic Investors
Insurance companies Mutual funds Investment banks
Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell
Total sample − − + − − + − − +
Subsample A − − + − − + − − +
Subsample B/B1 + + + + + + + + +
Panel B: Passive Institutional Non-member Domestic Investors
Commercial banks Savings banks Other companies
Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell
Total sample + + + + + + + + +
Subsample A + + + + + + + + +
Subsample B/B1 + + + + + + + + +
Panel C: Institutional and individual domestic investors
Institutional (M) Institutional (NM) Individual
Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell
Total sample − − + + + + + + +
Subsample A − − − + + + + + +
Subsample B/B1 + + + + + + + + +
Panel D: Total, domestic and foreign investors
Total Domestic Foreign
Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell
Total sample − − + + + + − − +
Subsample A − − + + + + − − +
Subsample B/B1 + + + + + + + + +
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Commercial banks', savings banks' and other compa-
nies' buy and sell trades have a positive feedback effect
on volatility for the whole sample as well as for the sub-
samples examined. This group of passive investors partic-
ipates in the markets as a residual portfolio activity
rather than as a core business operation, which is the
acceptance of deposits and loan supply for banks. This
positive buy and sell positive impact is more consistent
with trades that contain less fundamental information
(supporting H2a) as well as traders who engage in
herding and positive feedback trades based on short-lived
information (see again H1a).
To sum up, passive investors' trading volume is found
to affect volatility positively, whereas active investors'
total trading during the whole AFC period reduces vola-
tility. This result is reversed in the GFC period (see Sec-
tion 6). It is now worth looking at the aggregate buy and
sell trading behaviour of members and non-members as
well as that of individuals.
5.4.2 | Institutional and individual
(domestic) investors
In Panel A of Table 5, non-member institutionals' buy
and sell trades are aggregated and presented with the
other two domestic investors, namely the member insti-
tutional (securities companies) and the individual inves-
tors. The non-member institutional and individual
investors buy and sell trades affect volatility positively
across all subsamples. Both types of investors are reg-
arded here as less informed (see H2a) because they do
not hold a seat on the Korean Stock Exchange and, as a
result, they receive information about the order flow on a
second-hand basis (recall here the argument of De Long
et al. (1990) that in the presence of positive feedback
traders, rational speculation (or trading by institutional
non-member investors) can destabilize asset prices (H1a).
The results for buy and sell trades of individuals increas-
ing stock market volatility are also consistent with trades
TABLE 7 The volume—Volatility link (GFC period)
Panel A: Active Institutional Non-member Domestic Investors
Insurance companies Mutual funds Investment banks
Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell
Total sample + − + + − + + − +
Subsample A − − + + − + + − +
Subsample B/B1/B2 + + + + + + + + +
Panel B: Passive Institutional Non-member Domestic Investors
Commercial banks Savings banks Other companies
Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell
Total sample − − − + − + − − +
Subsample A − − − + − + − − +
Subsample B/B1/B2 + + + + + + + + +
Panel C: Institutional and Individual Domestic Investors
Institutional (M) Institutional (NM) Individual
Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell
Total sample + + + + − + + + +
Subsample A − + − + − + + + +
Subsample B/B1/B2 + + + + + + + + +
Panel D: Total, domestic and foreign investors
Total Domestic Foreign
Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell Total Buy Sell
Total sample + + + + + + + + +
Subsample A − − − + − + − − −
Subsample B/B1/B2 + + + + + + + + +
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that are affected by psychological biases and carry less
information (Barber and Odean, 2011).
Securities companies are members of the Korean
Stock Exchange and they have direct access to the trading
system. This gives an information advantage to this type
of investors, as they have minute information about the
supply and demand orders of the cash market. In the case
of these companies, which are the most informed among
domestic investors (and among the main liquidity pro-
viders), there is a negative impact on volatility through
their purchases and sales in the pre-crisis period (in line
with H2b). However, this result is reversed when we con-
sider the post-crisis period, where both buy and sell
trades affect volatility positively. Overall, the evidence for
the whole sample suggests that for institutional investors
who are members the causal negative effect from total
volume to volatility reflects the causal relation between
buy trades and volatility in the pre-crisis period. It is now
interesting to compare differences in the trading behav-
iour of domestic vs. foreign investors.
5.4.3 | Domestic and foreign investors
Panel B of Table 5 shows the effect of the total domestic
and foreign buy and sell trades on volatility. Concerning
the aggregated domestic investors' trading behaviour, we
observe that both buy and sell trades exacerbate volatility
over the whole period and the subsamples examined
(that is, their behaviour is identical to that of the non-
member institutional and individual investors). This
result is likely to be generated by herding or positive feed-
back trading (H1a) as well as uniformed trading (H2a).
Interestingly, we see that when we construct the aggre-
gate of all domestic investors we fail to recognize the neg-
ative effect of the purchase (and total) orders on volatility
for institutional members. As for Subsample B, the posi-
tive impact in the case of domestic investors is consistent
with the disaggregation of traders into institutional/indi-
vidual, members/non-members institutional and to
active/passive non-members institutional.
Regarding the foreign investors' trading behaviour,
the foreign sell trades affect volatility positively
(supporting H2a). The effect of buy trades on volatility
switches from negative in the period up to the AFC to
positive in the post-crisis period. It seems that foreign
purchases are more informative than foreign sales. That
is, foreign purchases are more value-motivated, while for-
eign sales are market phase or momentum-driven. These
findings are in accordance with those of Wang (2007),
who reported that foreign purchases tend to stabilize
stock markets—by increasing the investor base in emerg-
ing markets—especially in the first few years after
market liberalization when foreigners are buying into
local markets.
Overall, the evidence for the whole sample suggests
that the causal negative effect from total volume to vola-
tility reflects the causal relationship between foreign buy
trades and volatility in the pre-crisis period. This is in line
with the results of Karanasos and Kartsaklas (2009), who
show that the stabilizing impact of total volume on vola-
tility comes from the foreign volume effect.
5.4.4 | Summary
Table 6 provides a summary of the volume—volatility
link signs. The sell side of the trading activity (in all
but one cases) as well as the post-crisis buy side and
total trading activity in all volumes always exhibit a
positive sign. This is consistent with the findings of
Avramov et al. (2006), who concluded that sell herding
trades increase volatility. For the pre-crisis period and
the total sample, we observe the following: institu-
tional non-members affect market volatility positively
with their total and buy orders since the negative effect
of active investors is overridden by the passive inves-
tors' positive impact. Institutional members' trading
reduces volatility, a result which is consistent with the
findings of Cai et al. (2010) and Li and Wang (2010) for
the Chinese market. By contrast, the non-members and
individuals destabilize the market. The former result is
in line with those of Basak and Pavlova (2013) for the
US, while the latter is consistent with those of Foucault
et al. (2011) for France and Umutlu and Shackle-
ton (2015) for Korea.
A positive link is the prevailing result for the domes-
tic investors' trading activity when all domestic investor
groups are aggregated. On the other hand, foreign inves-
tors stabilize the market with their total and buy orders,
which is also reflected in the total volume (total and buy
side) of all investors trading on the KOSPI 200 index for
the entire 10-year period around the AFC and the pre-cri-
sis subsample. This result confirms the findings in
Wang (2007) for Indonesia and Thailand.
It is important to highlight here again that, overall,
buy orders appear to be more informative and value-
based, while sell orders are less informative and more
market phase driven. Additionally, the results suggest
that the causal effect from volume to volatility is sensitive
to structural changes. We find a uniform positive and sig-
nificant link between buy/sell orders and volatility in the
post-crisis period across all types of investors. However,
in the pre-crisis period buy orders affect volatility nega-
tively for various types of investors (member and active
non-member institutional, and foreign).
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6 | THE GFC PERIOD
Following the empirical analysis of the volume effect on
volatility around the Asian turmoil, we extend our inves-
tigation to the 2008 GFC in order to compare the two cri-
ses in terms of the trader-type effects on the Korean stock
market volatility. Our GFC sample spans from the 26th
of May 2006 to the 30th of December 2014 (2,133 obser-
vations). We calculate the detrended turnover volumes
for the different investor categories and the GK volatility,
similarly to the AFC period data. By carrying out the Bai
and Perron tests, two breakpoints are detected for the vol-
atility time series. The first break date is on October 29,
2008 and corresponds to the start of the crisis with the
subprime market collapse. The second break is identified
on 09/08/2011, the initial financial turmoil lasting for
years and being followed by the sovereign debt crisis in
the Eurozone area. Therefore the two subsamples are
defined as follows: i) Subsample A: May 26, 2006–Octo-
ber 29, 2008, the pre-crisis period until the first structural
break. ii) Subsample B: October 30, 2008–December 30,
2014, the post-crisis period from the first break until the
end of the sample, including the outset of the GFC and
the sovereign debt crisis. iii) Subsample B1: October 30,
2008–09/08/2011, the post-crisis period between the two
break dates, from the global crash until the beginning of
the sovereign debt crisis. iv) Subsample B2: 10/08/2011–
December 30, 2014, the post-crisis period from the second
break until the end of the sample, that is the late GFC
period. The results for subsamples B1 and B2 are totally
consistent with those for Subsample B and are omitted
for space considerations.
We apply the ARFI-FIGARCH model, as in the AFC
analysis, with volume regressors in the volatility mean
equation for the entire sample and the subsamples A, B,
B1 and B2. The best-fitting ARFI specifications for the
mean equation are similar to the AFC results, with the
ARFI(3, dm) process chosen in the pre-crisis subsample A
and the ARFI(1, dm) process in the remaining periods.
We present the GFC empirical evidence for the following
investor groups: institutional members, institutional non-
members (including the six different non-members sepa-
rately), individuals, total domestic investors, foreign
investors and total investors aggregated. The main results
of the mean equation cross effects, long-memory parame-
ters of the mean and the conditional variance and
GARCH coefficients are presented in Tables B1–B4 of the
Supplementary Appendix.
The sign analysis of the volume—volatility link for
the different trader types and across the GFC time inter-
vals (see Table 7) produces very interesting findings com-
pared to the Asian turmoil evidence. The post-crisis
subsamples always exhibit a positive link, as in the AFC
respective subsamples. Similarly, there is a positive link
in all cases for individual investors for both crises.
Overall, there are four main findings concerning the
causal relationship between volume and volatility for the
GFC vis-à-vis the AFC:
i) Concerning the signs, for the pre-crisis period and
the total sample, from the six different institutional non-
members separately, we observe stabilizing effects (for
both purchases and total trades) from the passive non-
members, whereas the total trades of the active ones
increase volatility, which is the opposite effect compared
to that implied by the AFC signs. Passive institutional
non-members trading seems to use limit orders and pur-
sue contrarian strategies, whereas the active ones are
affected by momentum or engage in herding and positive
feedback strategies in the GFC period, which is in accor-
dance with our investment style hypotheses (H1b and
H2a, respectively).
ii) Stabilizing effects of the domestic institutional
non-members' purchases in the global crash period,
which is a result of the negative volume link for all six
non-member categories buy side. This is also reflected in
the fact that domestic investors' purchases activity lowers
volatility in the pre-crisis period, a finding which is con-
sistent with the results in Che (2018) for Norway, and
those in Umutlu and Shackleton (2015) for the Korean
market. The financial liberalization, deregulation and
integration of the markets is more apparent during the
last decade of the GFC period, while in the AFC decade
the global integration process was still under develop-
ment, with increasing foreign ownership. Consequently,
we regard the non-members purchases as more informa-
tive in terms of value with less price volatility (investors
analyse fundamentals and market-wide information) dur-
ing the second crisis. This more sophisticated behaviour
can be attributed to the higher degree of economic glob-
alization and the massive advances in information-
processing technology.
iii) Institutional members' total and buy trading exac-
erbates volatility in the entire global crash period.
iv) Similarly to iii) foreign investors' and total (where
domestic and foreign investors are aggregated) volume
have a positive impact on volatility. Given the commer-
cial and financial integration at the global level, it is not
surprising that foreign investors have a less apparent
information advantage in the recent crisis than during
the AFC.
7 | CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the long-run dynamics of stock
market volatility using a dual long-memory model and it
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has investigated the effects of buy and sell trades by
trader type in the Korean Stock Exchange during two cri-
sis periods, the Asian one and the global crash. It has
investigated whether these effects are robust to the finan-
cial crisis structural breaks.
Sales have been shown to exhibit a destabilizing effect
on the market in most cases for both crises, confirming
the result in Avramov et al. (2006) that sell herding trades
increase volatility, whereas purchases seem to be more
informative. During the post-crisis periods, the trading
volume has been shown to increase volatility across all
investor groups.
In the AFC domestic individual trades exacerbate vol-
atility, a result which is consistent with the finding in
Foucault et al. (2011) that noise trading leads to excess
volatility. Domestic institutional investors are split into
non-members, whose behaviour also has a destabilizing
effect, and members with a stabilizing trading impact.
This negative influence is consistent with the results in
Umutlu and Shackleton (2015), who find that in Korea
trading by informed domestic institutional investors
reduces volatility. Inside the institutional non-members
group, we observe that passive investors increase volatil-
ity, whereas the stabilizers are the active ones. Domestic
investors' aggregate trading has a positive impact on vola-
tility, reflecting the less informative trading of individuals
and institutional non-members.
Foreign investors' buy orders have a stabilizing effect
on volatility in the AFC, which is in accordance with
value-motivated purchase decisions. These findings are
in line with Wang (2007), who finds that foreign pur-
chases tend to stabilize stock markets by increasing the
investor base in emerging markets, especially in the first
few years after market liberalization when foreigners are
buying into local markets. The negative impact of total
trading on volatility is determined by the foreign inves-
tors' purchases. Interestingly, in the GFC both buy and
sell trades from foreign investors, and, as a result, total
volume as well, affect volatility positively. This
destabilizing impact is consistent with the results in Choe
et al. (1999), Froot et al. (2001), and Che (2018), who find
that foreign investors are momentum traders. They also
confirm the results for the Korean market by Choe
et al. (2005), who find that foreign investors are less
informed, and by Jeon and Moffet (2010), who find that
foreign investors in Korea are involved in hedging and
positive feedback strategies.
Another major difference between the two crises is
that in the global crash, all six active and passive inves-
tors have a stabilizing impact with their purchases, which
mirrors the negative effect of the institutional non-mem-
bers' purchases. Regarding total trading, inside the insti-
tutional non-members group, we observed that active
investors lowered volatility in the Asian financial tur-
moil, while for the most recent crisis the stabilizers are
the passive non-members, which confirms the hypothesis
that passive traders use limit orders and engage in con-
trarian trades (H1b). In addition, the destabilizing effect
of active (total) trading on volatility during the global
crash is consistent with herding and positive feedback
trades based on short-lived information (H1a).
Overall, our results suggest that the buy and sell
trades can have an asymmetric effect on volatility, which
depends on the type of investor trading and on the eco-
nomic cycle's phase. Lastly, we find that the apparent
long memory in volatility is quite robust to mean shifts.
However, when we take into account structural breaks
the order of integration of the conditional variance series
decreases considerably.
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ENDNOTES
1 See also other investor sentiment studies such as Yu and
Yuan (2011), Stambaugh et al. (2012), Antoniou et al. (2013), and
Shen et al. (2017).
2 Thomas et al. (2014) in their study on institutional investors focus
on pension funds’ activity and provide evidence on the negative
relationship between pension funds’ stock investments and stock
market volatility in a wide range of OECD countries.
3 Similarly, Cella et al. (2013) focus on the investment horizon of
institutional investors in the US. During crisis periods, short-hori-
zon institutional sales lead to larger price drops and reversals than
long-term institutional trading, which means excess volatility.
Among the researchers exploring investors’ sentiments in the US
market, Wang (2018) and DeVault et al. (2019) demonstrate that
institutional traders are highly driven by sentiment in their trad-
ing activity exhibiting bounded rationality.
4 Likewise, Choe et al. (1999) and Froot et al. (2001) find that for-
eign investors tend to be momentum investors.
5 Choe et al. (2005) demonstrate that foreign investors are charac-
terized by an information disadvantage compared to domes-
tic ones.
6 Source: Korean Stock Exchange Fact Book 2014–15.
7 Source: MSCI Global Market Accessibility Review, June 2019.
8 Source: Classifying South Korea as a Developed Market, January
2013, White Paper Report FTSE Publications by Woods, C.
9 It was necessary (in order to obtain any results) to use an outlier
reduced series for Savings banks Sell Turnover and Other compa-
nies Sell Turnover: the variance of the detrended data is
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estimated, and any value outside four standard deviations is rep-
laced by four standard deviations. Chebyshev's inequality is used
as it i) gives a bound of what percentage (1/k2) of the data falls
outside of k standard deviations from the mean, ii) makes no
assumption about the distribution of the data, and iii) provides a
good description of the closeness to the mean, especially when
the data are known to be unimodal as in our case.
10 To check the sensitivity of our results to different error distribu-
tions, we re-estimate our dual long-memory GARCH models
using the skewed-t density with asymmetries. The results of the
volume-volatility link are identical to those reported for the nor-
mal distribution (these results are available upon request).
11 In addition, we test the hypothesis of long-memory following
Robinson's (1995) semiparametric bivariate approach and the
results are consistent with the parametric ones.
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APPENDIX A.
TABLE A1 Variance equations:
GARCH coefficients (AFC period)
Panel A: Active institutional non-member domestic investors
Insurance companies Mutual funds Investment banks





































Panel B: Passive Institutional Non-member Domestic Investors
Commercial banks Savings banks Other companies





































Notes: The table reports estimates of the ARCH (α) and GARCH (β) parameters in the variance
equations. α, β are defined in Equation (2). The estimates are reported only for the case when
total TVt is added as regressor and not for the buy-sell side of each series, The estimates of the
subsample B1 are not reported for space reasons. ***, **, *, and ∘ denote significance at the 0.01,
0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
TABLE A2 Variance equations:
GARCH coefficients (AFC period)
Panel A: Institutional and individual domestic investors
Institutional (M) Institutional (NM) Individual





































Panel B: Total, domestic and foreign investors
Total Domestic Foreign





































Notes: See notes in Table A1.
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TABLE A3 The impact of volume on volatility: A summary of papers
Investor categories Authors Countries Impact Hypothesis
Institutional Daigler and Wiley (1999) US - H2b
Li and Wang (2010) China - H2b
Cai et al. (2010) China - H2b
Umutlu and Shackleton (2015) Korea - H2b
Yang et al. (2017) Korea - H2b
Che (2018) Norway - H2b
Basak and Pavlova (2013) Theory + H1a
Bae et al. (2011) Korea + H1a
Individuals Daigler and Wiley (1999) US + H2a
Cai et al. (2010) China + H2a
Foucault et al. (2011) France + H2a
Umutlu and Shackleton (2015) Korea + H2a
Yang et al. (2017) Korea + H2a
Che (2018) Norway - H1b
Bae et al. (2011) Korea - H1b
Foreign Brennan and Cao (1997) US + H1a, H2a
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) Finland + H1a
Jeon and Moffett (2010) Korea + H1a
Bae et al. (2011) Korea + H1a
Chen et al. (2013) China + H2a
Che (2018) Norway + H1a, H2a
Wang (2007) Indonesia, Thailand - H1b
Yang et al. (2017) Korea - H2b
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